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HEIDEGGER’S KANTIAN READING OF ARISTOTLE’S 
THEOLOGIKE EPISTEME 
 FRANÇOIS JARAN 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics is probably further than we ourselves are 
today in philosophy. 
—Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion 
HEIDEGGER’S AFFINITY for Aristotle’s and Kant’s works is 
probably what best describes his trajectory during the 1920s.  After a 
passionate dialogue with Augustine and before turning his attention 
towards Hölderlin, these two philosophers served as privileged 
interlocutors in the elaboration of Sein und Zeit’s fundamental 
ontology, as well as in the reformulation of this same project in what 
would be called a metaphysics of Dasein.  The importance given to 
the two of them at that time is obviously tied to their respective 
reflections on the essence and the conditions of possibility of 
metaphysics. 
Before initiating a discussion with the metaphysical tradition 
under the sign of an overcoming [Überholung, Überwindung] in the 
1930s, Heidegger first tried to examine the possibility of metaphysics.  
In the 1920s, in fact, he spoke of a “retrieval” or a “repetition” 
[Wiederholung] of the ontological and metaphysical questionings.  
Guided by Aristotle’s efforts to establish a first philosophy that would 
give an account of beings both in their universality and in their 
primacy, Heidegger also attached fundamental importance to Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason, the sole, explicit attempt known to history to 
question metaphysically the possibility of metaphysics.  However, 
Heidegger was not merely inspired by these philosophical attempts: he 
proposed to retrieve or repeat these two metaphysical investigations 
so that the questions that had been hidden under concealments 
brought about by tradition might come to light.   
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The great retrievals to which Heidegger then proceeds are well 
known: the first pages of Sein und Zeit evoked an “explicit retrieval 
[ausdrückliche Wiederholung] of the question of being,”1 while the 
fourth and last part of Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik spoke of 
a “laying of the ground for metaphysics in a retrieval [in einer 
Wiederholung].”2  However, besides these two attempts, Heidegger 
retrieved  other traditional problems.  A retrieval exercise that is not 
so well known is that of Aristotle’s problem of the divine [to\ qei=on], 
which Heidegger tried to interpret in a nonreligious sense, as an 
endeavor concerning the world.  This paper will approach this peculiar 
retrieval, which disclosed a previously unknown bond between the 
metaphysical projects of Aristotle, Kant, and Heidegger. 
Even though Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason constitutes the 
principal model for Heidegger’s Metaphysics of Dasein it would be 
impossible to understand this project without taking into account his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and the questions this text 
left open.3 Confronted with the contemporaneous interpretations of 
Aristotle’s works—those by Werner Jaeger and Paul Natorp— 
Heidegger proposed to revive Aristotle’s questioning process.  
Convinced that the traditional readings of Aristotle’s works concealed 
problems that Aristotle himself could not solve, Heidegger wanted to 
return to the source and try to read with new, phenomenological eyes 
                                                     
1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
2001), 2; trans. J. Stambaugh, Being and Time (New York: SUNY, 1996), 1; 
hereafter SZ.  Here and below, the first citations of Heidegger’s texts list the 
German edition followed by the English translation, should one be available.  
In subsequent notes only the abbreviation for the German edition will be 
given followed by the volume number (when applicable), page numbers for 
the German edition, and page numbers for the translation, for example, SZ 
2/1, or with volume number GA 2.1/2. 
2 Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, in Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3  
(Frankfurt am M.: Klostermann, 1991), 204; trans. R. Taft, Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 144.  
References to Heidegger’s writings will generally be to the Gesamtausgabe 
(Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann, 1976–); hereafter GA. 
3 Some pages taken from the 1929/30 winter semester dedicated to a 
correct interpretation of Aristotle’s prw/th filosofi/a are probably the most 
enlightening: Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–
Einsamkeit, in GA, vol. 29/30 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983), §§ 8–
12; trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker, The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2001).   
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the texts that gave birth to what would later be called “metaphysics.”  
On this path, Kant was to give Heidegger a helpful hand.  As this paper 
will show, Heidegger found arguments in Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason to legitimize his interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the 
“divine.” 
I 
 If the Heideggerian endeavors of the 1920s can all be 
considered as retrieval attempts, the methodological implications of 
such an undertaking were rarely a subject of discussion in the 
published texts,4 and this is quite problematic insofar as the concept 
played an essential role in the very structure of Sein und Zeit.5  Not 
only does the retrieval concern the basic task of the essay—the 
“explicit retrieval of the question of being” 6 —it is also a basic 
methodological concept of “phenomenological destruction,” which 
describes Heidegger’s relation to the history of philosophy in the 
1920s. 
 Even though the “phenomenological destruction of the history 
of ontology” was never published as planned in Sein und Zeit (§6), the 
principles of destruction and of retrieval continued to govern 
Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy in the following years.  
In his lecture course from the summer semester 1928, dedicated to 
Leibniz, Heidegger exposed these principles, opposing them to those 
of the neo-Kantian Problemgeschichte. 
                                                     
4 Concerning the “retrieval” or the “repetition,” see Robert Bernasconi, 
“Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger’s Destructuring of the Distinction 
Between Essence and Existence in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology,” in 
Reading Heidegger From the Start.  Essays in His Earliest Thought, eds.  
Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (New York: SUNY, 1994), 123–36; as well 
as John D. Caputo, “Hermeneutics as the Recovery of Man,” Man and World 
15, (1982): 343–67. 
5 As Paul Ricoeur once clearly highlighted it, §§67–71 proceed to a 
“repetition” or a “recapitulation” of the first section’s analyses, to show their 
temporal content.  See Temps et récit.  3.  Le temps raconté (Paris: Seuil, 
1985), 122; trans. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer, Time and Narrative, vol. 3 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 66. 
6 SZ 2/1.   
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Fundamental ontology is always only a retrieval [Wiederholung] of 
what is ancient, of what happened earlier.  But what is ancient is 
transmitted to us by retrieval, only if we grant it the possibility of 
transformation.  For by their nature these problems demand as 
much.  All this has its basis, as we will show in detail, in the 
historicity of the understanding of being.  And characteristically, 
the tradition [Tradition], i.e., the externalized transmission 
[Weitergabe], deprives the problem of this very transformation in a 
retrieval.  Tradition passes down definite propositions and 
opinions, fixed ways of questioning and discussing things.  This 
external tradition of opinions and anonymous viewpoints is 
currently called “the history of problems” [Problemgeschichte].  The 
external tradition, and its employment in the history of philosophy, 
denies problems their life, and that means it seeks to stifle their 
transformation, and so we must fight against it.7 
What distinguishes the retrieval from other methods of historical 
exegesis is that it gives the problems the possibility to come back to 
life, that is, to be reactivated so that they are not merely transmitted, 
but undergo a transformation and present themselves to human Dasein 
along with their whole problematic content.8  The retrieval never 
manifests purely historical interest in the history of philosophy.  It 
always considers history as the key to seizing the historicity of 
Dasein’s present understanding of being. 
Under the auspices of the retrieval, the book Kant und das 
Problem der Metaphysik, published two years after Sein und Zeit, 
proposed a “phenomenological destruction” of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, whose aim was to retrieve the project of “laying the ground 
for metaphysics.”9  In this book, Heidegger defined the link between 
his undertaking and Kant’s text as follows: 
                                                     
7 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, in 
GA, vol. 26 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), 197; trans. M. Heim, The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984), 155; slightly modified translation. 
8  In the lecture course from the summer semester 1920, Heidegger 
already opposed the destruction [Destruktion] or the dismantling [Abbau] 
with the simple adoption [Übernahme] of a philosophical system as 
Kantianism, and with the idea of a repristination [Repristination], that is, the 
restoration to an original and pure state of the philosophical texts.  See 
Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der 
philosophischen Begriffsbildung, in GA, vol. 59 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1993), 5 and 95. 
9 Even though this book no longer used the phenomenological language 
of the destruction, it is nonetheless as a “phenomenological” attempt that the 
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The idea, however, attested to through this interpretation, provides 
an indication of the problem of a fundamental ontology.  This is not 
to be perceived as something supposedly “new,” as opposed to the 
allegedly “old.” Rather, it is the expression of the attempt to adopt 
in an original way what is essential in a laying of the ground for 
metaphysics, i.e., to aid in the ground-laying through a retrieval 
[Wiederholung] of its own, more original, possibility.10 
Regardless of Kant’s solution to the problem of metaphysics, 
Heidegger’s retrieval of his questioning opens this philosophical 
reflection to its very own possibility—that is, to possibilities which 
were made effective by Kant or remained latent in his works.  This 
questioning exceeds the sole Kantian text by enabling a wider 
examination that would explore untapped possibilities. 
In the first lines of the fourth section of the Kantbuch, Heidegger 
attempts to give a definition of the retrieval:  
By the retrieval of a basic problem, we understand the opening-up 
of its original, long-concealed possibilities, through the working-out 
of which it is transformed.  In this way it first comes to be 
preserved in its capacity as a problem.11  
The retrieval thus works by opening up a specific problem’s own “long-
concealed” possibilities, an opening up which is at the same time a 
transformation.  However, the retrieval does not give the problem a 
new form; it only helps it recover its original content and possibilities 
by taking it out of the framework in which tradition has enclosed it.  
The problem of the laying of the grounds for metaphysics thus gives a 
new voice to the Critique of Pure Reason, going beyond what the text 
explicitly explained.  The aim of this interpretation of the Kantian text 
is thus not to betray Kant’s first intention but to continue his own 
questioning toward possibilities that were opened up by the Critique 
itself. 
In the unpublished lecture Hegel und das Problem der 
Metaphysik, given in Amsterdam on March 22nd, 1930,12 the status of 
                                                     
Heidegger of the mid-1930s understood his work.  See the preface to the 
fourth edition of the Kantbuch (text to be found in GA, vol. 3, xiii/xvii) on 
this. 
10 GA 3. 203/142. 
11 Ibid., 204/143. 
12 The text of the lecture, which will be published as part of volume 80 of 
the GA, is already available in H. France-Lanord and F.  Midal eds., La fête de 
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the Wiederholung is more precisely defined.  In this context, Heidegger 
does not discuss the retrieval of the laying of the grounds for 
metaphysics, as is still the case in the Kantbuch, but the retrieval of its 
“achievement”:  
If Hegel’s metaphysics really represents the achievement 
[Vollendung] of Western metaphysics, how can we still talk about a 
problem of metaphysics? . . .  But metaphysics still is a possible 
problem and this means that the argument [Auseinandersetzung] 
with Hegel becomes necessary, despite the fact that Hegel’s 
metaphysics is an achievement; especially if what comes to its 
achievement in Hegel is something that is not original in itself and 
if the metaphysics that comes to its end is the one in which the 
fundamental question fails to appear.13 
Insofar as metaphysics still holds a possibility that its “first” 
achievement failed to notice, it is possible to retrieve the metaphysical 
endeavor once more.  This concealed possibility is, according to 
Heidegger, that of a questioning that would not deal with beings but 
with being as such.  Here, the distinction between a fundamental 
question [Grundfrage] and a guiding question [Leitfrage] appears in 
Heidegger’s works. 14  However, according to Heidegger, the 
fundamental question of metaphysics—the question of being as such, 
then understood as the question concerning the intimate link between 
being and time and the conditions of possibility of the understanding 
                                                     
la pensée. Hommage à François Fédier (Paris: Lettrage Distribution, 2001), 
16–62; hereafter HPM. 
13 Ibid., 36 ; italics in the original. 
14 This distinction can be found in the summer semester 1930 lecture 
course (Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit.  Einleitung in die 
Philosophie, in GA, vol. 31 [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1982]; trans. T.  
Sadler, The Essence of Human Freedom.  An Introduction to Philosophy 
[London: Continuum Books, 2002]) and in the winter semester 1930/31 lecture 
course (Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, in GA, vol. 32 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Klostermann, 1980); trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988]), but 
not in the summer semester 1929 lecture course (Der deutsche Idealismus 
(Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der 
Gegenwart, in GA, vol. 28)—from which the major part of this Amsterdam 
lecture comes—nor in the winter semester 1929/30 lecture course (Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt–Endlichkeit–Einsamkeit, in GA, vol. 
29/30).  In a revised version, this terminology reappears in the texts of the 
Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), in GA, vol. 65 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 1989); trans. P. Emad and K. Maly, Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
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of being contained in Dasein—appeared neither in Hegel’s works nor 
anywhere in the whole history of metaphysics, which only examined 
beings as such [ti/ to\ o1n].  Nevertheless, Heidegger planned to raise the 
question of being as such, as the retrieval of the traditional 
metaphysical question concerning beings.  Thus, the reawakening of 
the question of being and its explicit retrieval do not constitute, as it 
might be misinterpreted, the complete rejection of the whole 
metaphysical tradition from the Greeks to Hegel.  It has to be 
understood as a retrieval, a recovery of their work, an endeavor that 
makes it possible to raise the question that historical metaphysics 
never fully succeeded in asking. 
The fundamental question is thus reached thanks to the retrieval 
and radicalization of the guiding question, and not by rejecting it or 
leaving it behind, nor by overcoming the metaphysical tradition.  The 
question of being that Heidegger wants to raise is not a new question 
but, one might say, a question that was never fully explored in the 
history of metaphysics.  The fundamental ontology seeks to retrieve 
the questioning at the point where such a possibility was opened and 
closed.  That is why the question of being, the fundamental question, is 
intrinsically tied to a historical investigation concerned with the 
metaphysical guiding question. 
However, if the question about beings really found its solution or 
its achievement in Hegel’s absolute metaphysics, how can we begin to 
recover this inheritance? In the conference about Hegel’s metaphysics, 
Heidegger wrote,  
The only possibility left is the retrieval [Wiederholung] of the 
traditional guiding question: what is a being?, but so that this 
question is brought back to the ground that lies hidden in it, i.e.  so 
that we succeed in bringing to its elaboration and real happening 
the concrete question concerning being’s essence and essential 
ground.  This self-unfolding problematic of the fundamental 
question is rooted in the problematic that was indicated with the 
title “Being and Time.”15 
We can clearly see how the metaphysics of Dasein is placed in 
relation to tradition.  Hegel accomplished metaphysics without putting 
an end to the “problem” of metaphysics—that is, without closing all 
possibility of questioning it.  Hegel’s metaphysics should thus be 
                                                     
15 HPM 52. 
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considered the achievement of the questioning concerning beings, or 
beingness of beings, an achievement that omitted the fundamental 
question about being as such.  This achievement of metaphysics would 
only be a false appearance, insofar as a more original metaphysics is 
still possible.16  Thus the metaphysics Heidegger was trying to found—
the metaphysics of Dasein—was a metaphysics that intended to reveal 
metaphysics’ traditional ground, thanks to a retrieval of its 
questioning, which always means a transformation of it as well.  This 
metaphysics of Dasein had the task of raising metaphysics’ guiding 
question, so as to make possible metaphysics’ fundamental question 
concerning being and time.  However, the question about beings does 
not necessarily constitute an arbitrary question that would only be of 
historical interest.  It is through this question, and only through it, that 
we are able to reach the fundamental question concerning the meaning 
of being. 
If Heidegger was later to interpret this transition from the guiding 
question to the fundamental question as the overcoming of 
metaphysics as such, he first understood it as the radicalization and 
retrieval of latent potentialities.  However, the problem of being is not 
the only problem that was retrieved during these metaphysical years.  
As will now be shown, Heidegger also took into account another 
question, buried under centuries of tradition.  While reading Aristotle’s 
works in the 1920s, Heidegger took an interest in the Aristotelian 
concept of the divine.  This problem, Heidegger wrote, was rapidly 
taken over by the Christian tradition and reinterpreted from the 
perspective of the creation of the world, but  it could include, as we 
will see, untapped possibilities that philosophy is still able to retrieve. 
II 
The interpretation Heidegger gave of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in 
the 1920s is not only a guideline for an understanding of the genesis 
and the decline of the fundamental ontology but also constitutes an 
incursion into the eternal debates on the object and structure of 
Aristotle’s first philosophy.  Far from being a trivial projection of 
                                                     
16 Ibid. 
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Heidegger’s thoughts on Aristotle’s text, this reading represents an 
original and serious solution to the question of the relation between 
the science of “being qua being” [o@n h[| o1n] and “theology” [qeologikh\ 
e0pisth/mh] in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  Instead of assuming some sort 
of evolution in Aristotle’s thought, or a mere incoherence, Heidegger 
tried to show that this tension between ontology and theology is a 
fundamental feature of the essence of metaphysical thought itself.  The 
well-known thesis concerning the existence of an onto-theological 
structure of metaphysics appeared at that precise moment, as a result 
of Heidegger’s participation in debates, opposing thinkers such as 
Werner Jaeger and Paul Natorp.17 
However, besides this particular interpretation of the relation 
between ontology and theology in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Heidegger 
also proposed an original reading of the object of the qeologikh\ 
e0pisth/mh.  Opposing many readings of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
Heidegger attempted to show that what were usually understood as 
theological problems were in fact absolutely alien to Aristotle’s 
thought.  According to Heidegger’s reading, the qeologikh\ e0pisth/mh 
does not consist of a research concerning God and His possible 
existence.  Rather, it presents an investigation into the problem of the 
world or, as Heidegger puts it, concerning “beings as a whole” [das 
Seiende im Ganzen].  According to Heidegger, traditional metaphysics 
could not tackle this problem of beings as a whole without 
immediately referring to a creative God, an Unmoved Mover, thought 
of as the efficient cause of physical nature.  However, this would not 
have been the case in Aristotle, where the Unmoved Mover was not the 
efficient but the final cause of physical nature.  Any similarity between 
Aristotle and some proof of God’s existence was considered by 
Heidegger as a “complete misunderstanding of the qei=on, which, in 
Aristotle, is at least left to stand as a problem.”18  Aristotle’s problem of 
the divine, according to Heidegger, would lead to a question 
concerning the world that did not consider it in terms of its “ground” 
[Grund], but that considered it as a “whole” [Ganzes].  The theological 
interpretation of this concept would be the work of Aristotelianism—
                                                     
17  On this, see my La métaphysique du Dasein.  Heidegger et la 
possibilité de la métaphysique (1927-1930) (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2010), 
part 1, ch. 2. 
18 GA, vol. 29/30, p. 67/44. 
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not of Aristotle himself.  However, to prove his point, Heidegger did 
not refer to the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.  Rather, he tried to 
show that this specific problem of the world was an authentic 
metaphysical problem.  As we will see, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
served his desire to retrieve this forgotten problem.  My objective in 
this paper is, then, to read the interpretation Heidegger gives of 
Aristotle’s qeologikh\ e0pisth/mh and of the concept of qei=on, in order to 
expose the parallels between Aristotle’s and Kant’s enterprises clearly.   
This particular Heideggerian interpretation of the concept of qei=on 
beyond the Christian tradition appeared in the lecture courses of the 
1920s, which Heidegger dedicated to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and to 
Greek philosophy in general.  We find the first traces of this idea in the 
summer semester of 1922, dedicated to a phenomenological 
interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology and logic.  Here, Heidegger tried 
to show that the use Aristotle made of the adjective qei=on should not 
be interpreted within a religious perspective.19  The definition Aristotle 
gives of “wisdom” [sofi/a] in the first book of the Metaphysics as the 
“science of the “divine things,” [ta\ qei=a”] was not a testimony of some 
prescientific phase in Aristotle’s evolution—as Werner Jaeger would 
put it—but should be read in the light of the eighth book of Physics, 
which constitutes, for Heidegger, the key to an understanding of 
Aristotle’s theology.  In the summer of 1922, he wrote, 
For Aristotle, the concept of qei=on [divine] comes from the problem 
of fu/sij [nature], that is to say, from its fundamental 
determination, that is ki/nhsij [movement].  And in fact, the 
clarification of the objective sense of the qei=on and its sense of 
being is an ontological interpretation of the fundamental mobility of 
beings.20  
The concept of qei=on should then be understood as emerging from the 
phenomenon of ki/nhsij, rather than from some religious experience.  
The same idea was also presented in the famous Natorp-Bericht in the 
fall of 1922:  
For Aristotle, the idea of the divine does not come from the 
explanation of an object to which we would arrive through a 
                                                     
19  Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen 
des Aristoteles zu Ontologie une Logik, in GA, vol. 62 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Klostermann, 2005), 101. 
20 Ibid., 99. 
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fundamental religious experience.  The qei=on is rather the 
expression of the supreme character of being that results from the 
ontological radicalization of the idea of the moved being [des 
Bewegtseienden].21 
Thus, Aristotle’s God, the Unmoved Mover, would have no 
connection with religious and traditional theological problems, with 
which it has been associated throughout history.  Considered by 
Heidegger as the “ferment”22 of the history of philosophy and theology 
up to Hegel, this notion of the qei=on found its origin in Aristotle’s 
attempt to understand nature’s movement.  If we interpret Aristotle’s 
Physics as the first proof of God’s existence, we only impose on Greek 
thought schemas that are proper to a later theology.  Despite the 
importance that the Unmoved Mover might have had in Hegel’s 
concept of the Absolute Spirit and all the history of Christian theology, 
Aristotle’s God is at the outset a nontheological God, a mere “neutral 
ontological concept”23 that has nothing to do with the “conceptual 
expression of religious life.”24 
This would also be the case regarding Plato.  In the winter 
semester 1924/25, in his lecture course on Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger 
wrote:  
Already in Plato, where the notion of the qei=on has a more obscure 
and much more comprehensive sense than in Aristotle, “divine” 
does not have a religious meaning. . . .  We must conceive the 
“divine” in a worldly sense [in einem weltlichen Sinn], or—from 
the standpoint of Christianity—in a pagan sense, insofar as qei=on, 
“divine,” here simply means to relate, in one’s knowledge, to those 
beings having the highest rank in the order of reality.  Included here 
is nothing like a connection of the divine or of god to an individual 
man in the sense of a direct personal relationship.25 
This “worldly” or “pagan” sense of the divine justifies Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theology as something that is different 
                                                     
21 Ibid., 389. 
22 Ibid., 100. 
23 Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie, in GA, vol. 22 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Klostermann, 1993), 179. 
24 GA 62.101. 
25 Platon: Sophistes, in GA, vol. 19 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
1992), 242; trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Plato’s Sophist (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2003), 167.  Heidegger refers here to Plato’s Sophist 
(216b9ff.) 
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from a science of God.  It is rather as a science of the world or a 
science of beings as a whole that Heidegger speaks of Aristotle’s 
qeologikh\ e0pisth/mh.  Even though it was later interpreted as the 
science of the ground of the world, of its cause, that is not yet the case 
in Aristotle.  Heidegger  thus writes:  
Theology [qeologikh\ e0pisth/mh] has the task of clarifying beings as a 
whole, the o3lon, the beings of the world, nature, the heavens, and 
everything under them. . . .  It must be noted that the clarification of 
beings as a whole, nature, by means of an unmoved mover, has 
nothing to do with proving God through a causal argument.”26 
Nonetheless, this question of the concept of beings as a whole, 
concerning the o3lon, would have quickly been replaced by a question 
concerning the “highest sphere of beings” [timiw/taton ge/noj], 
understood as the divine ground of the world, God [qeo/j].  According 
to Heidegger, there would be an attempt in Aristotle to question the 
world independently of all questioning concerned with a possible 
causation of the world.  This theological problem would have 
disappeared with the emergence of the theological questions that take 
the world as a mere summation of all beings, which has to be 
questioned with respect to its creative ground, to the creator hidden 
behind all beings.  Heidegger saw this deviation of the original problem 
as the work of Aristotelianism and not of Aristotle.   
With this in mind, we could consider that the attempt Heidegger 
made to think of the world from Dasein’s standpoint as “being-in-the-
world” or as a “world-forming being” was some sort of solution to 
Aristotle’s questioning of the world as a whole.  In his essay Vom 
Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger explains that the fundamental ontology 
understands the world neither as the summation of all beings, nor with 
respect to its cause, but as the whole of all relations with beings which 
Dasein is able to project and bring to understanding: “World as a 
wholeness ‘is’ not a being, it is rather that from out of which Dasein 
signifies to itself, toward which beings it can comport itself and how 
it can.”27 In this perspective, world is understood as the wholeness of 
                                                     
26 GA 19. 222/153. 
27 “Welt als Ganzheit ‘ist’ kein Seiendes, sondern das, aus dem her das 
Dasein sich zu bedeuten gibt, zu welchem Seienden und wie es sich dazu 
verhalten kann.”  Vom Wesen des Grundes, in Wegmarken (1919-1961), vol. 
9, GA (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976), 157; trans. W. McNeill, 
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the possibilities Dasein gives to beings.  World is not the summation of 
all effective beings, but rather a frame that contains the possibilities of 
beings and in which beings have to appear. 
A century and a half earlier, another German philosopher had also 
thought of beings as having to enter reality, passing through just such a 
frame of all possibilities.  With his concept of a “transcendental ideal,” 
Kant paved the way for Heidegger’s understanding of the world as a 
whole.  And as we will see, Heidegger also considered this Kantian 
notion as the key concept to understanding Aristotle’s qeologikh\ 
e0pisth/mh, as well as the traditional misunderstandings about 
Aristotle’s position.   
III 
Thus, in many of his 1920s lecture courses Heidegger affirmed 
that the Aristotelian problem of the qei=on opened ways of questioning 
to which the philosophers who followed were blind.  Instead of 
following Aristotle’s intuitions, they dedicated all their efforts to the 
problem of the foundation or causation of the whole of beings by a 
supreme being, a qeo/j.  As Heidegger wrote in the winter semester of 
1926/27, “In this Aristotelian point of departure lies a fundamental 
problem which the tradition concealed by misinterpreting it in a 
theological, Christian and anthropological way.” 28  This theological 
deviation or deflection of an authentic theiological problem that 
characterizes the whole of Western metaphysical tradition constitutes 
an important issue in Heidegger’s “Zurück zu Aristoteles!” of the 
1920s.   
In the summer 1928 lecture course dedicated to Leibniz, 
Heidegger gave a schematic overview of his understanding of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics and of the tasks we face when trying to 
retrieve metaphysical questions.  In this presentation, Heidegger also 
referred to the recent debates concerning the unity of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, as found in the works of Natorp and Jaeger.  Natorp 
considered Aristotle’s solution in the fifth book of the Metaphysics to 
                                                     
Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 121; italics in 
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28 GA 22. 330. 
580    FRANÇOIS JARAN 
be incoherent, while Jaeger thought it testified to Aristotle’s general 
evolution from theology to ontology. 29   In this lecture course, 
Heidegger rejected both solutions, concluding, “these questions cannot 
be resolved solely through historical-philological interpretation.”30 He 
maintained that the question of the unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
could not be solved by simply reading the texts, but it also required a 
good acquaintance with the history of Western thought, in which the 
essence of metaphysics manifested itself.  A good knowledge of 
Aristotle is not sufficient, said Heidegger.  One also has to be 
concerned about these problems in order to understand what is at 
stake here.  Heidegger writes:  
These questions cannot be resolved solely through historical-
philological interpretation.  On the contrary, this interpretation 
itself requires that we be guided by an understanding of the 
problem which is a match for what is handed down [diese bedarf 
selbst die Leitung durch ein Problemverständnis, das dem 
Überlieferten gewachsen ist].  And we must first acquire such an 
understanding.31  
The understanding of the nature of metaphysical questioning and of 
the meaning of each of its orientations is a requirement for correctly 
grasping Aristotle’s problem.  What might at first astonish the reader of 
this lecture course is that, here, Heidegger explicitly referred to Kant.  
Heidegger wrote: “See Kant on this point: ‘Von dem transzendentalen 
Ideal,’ Kritik der reinen Vernunft.”32 
Heidegger thus singled out a link between Aristotle’s fundamental 
metaphysical problem and the precise chapter of Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason that is concerned with the transcendental ideal.  This 
note is somewhat enigmatic, insofar as it does not say in what way this 
chapter constitutes what Heidegger calls an “understanding of the 
problem which is a match for what is handed down.”  However, there 
is no doubt that Heidegger considered this precise chapter, “Of the 
                                                     
29 On this, see Enrico Berti, “La Metafisica di Aristotele: ‘Onto-teologia’ o 
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31 Ibid. 
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Transcendental Ideal,” as a contribution to such an understanding—
even though he did not tell us how.   
The aforementioned chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason 
introduces a section dedicated to the “Grounds of proof 
[Beweisgründen] of speculative reason inferring the existence of a 
highest being” and thus, to a topic intimately linked to that of the onto-
theological unity of metaphysics.  That particular problem of God’s 
existence reveals, according to Heidegger, that Kant belonged to the 
onto-theological tradition.  In 1927, long before the 1961 conference 
Kants These über das Sein, Heidegger already thought that the 
statement of the ontological thesis—“Sein ist kein reales Prädikat”—
in a theological context should not be considered astonishing:  
Kant discusses the most general concept of being, where he is 
dealing with the knowability of a wholly determinate, distinctive 
being, namely, God.  But, to anyone who knows the history of 
philosophy (ontology), this fact is so little surprising that it rather 
simply makes clear how directly Kant stands in the great tradition 
of ancient and Scholastic ontology.  God is the supreme being, 
summum ens, the most perfect being, ens perfectissimum.  What 
most perfectly is, is obviously most suited to be the exemplary 
being, from which the idea of being can be read off.33 
Nevertheless, in the lecture course of summer 1928, Heidegger did 
not refer to Kant’s thesis about being but to a very precise chapter of 
the first Critique in which a particular problem arises.  As I would like 
to show here, Kant’s chapter “Of the Transcendental Ideal” gave 
precise indications for the Aristotelian problem which was mentioned 
earlier, namely, that of an interpretation of “divine” [qei=on] in terms of 
“God” [qeo/j], the theological interpretation of the pagan problem of the 
divine.  It seems that Kant tried to determine, before Heidegger, what 
drives philosophical thinking from qei=on towards qeo/j—or, to 
paraphrase Kant, from the transcendental ideal towards the God of 
theology.  As this paper will show, this Kantian concept of a 
transcendental ideal gives some clues to the misinterpretation of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics by his followers. 
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To my knowledge, the only person who has tried to give an 
interpretation of Heidegger’s enigmatic reference to Kant’s 
transcendental ideal in the summer 1928 lecture course is Enrico Berti, 
in his article on the onto-theological structure of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics.  According to Berti, Heidegger was here referring to his 
Kantbuch and to the sections he dedicated to the distinction between 
ontology [metaphysica generalis] and special metaphysics 
[metaphysica specialis], a distinction understood as a retrieval of 
Aristotle’s onto-theological problem.34  However, Berti did not take into 
account the fact that Heidegger explicitly referred here to one precise 
chapter of Kant’s Critique, a chapter that plays  no important role in 
the Kantbuch.35 
Heidegger evoked the problem of the transcendental ideal a few 
times in his lecture courses and writings,36 usually referring to Kant’s 
understanding of finite knowledge and to the fact that God has 
knowledge of the totality of possibilities.  In these years, Heidegger 
was to insist many times on the fact that reason’s finitude is always 
thought of negatively in modern philosophy, as compared to an infinite 
reason.  The concept was considered for the first time in the winter 
1926/27 lecture course, entitled Geschichte der Philosophie von 
Thomas von Aquin bis Kant.  In this text, Heidegger gave great 
importance to Kant’s concept of the transcendental ideal, considering 
it the point of departure for all post-Kantian philosophy, “above all, for 
the most significant philosophy, that of Schelling and Hegel.”37  And, 
while showing how the onto-theological structure of metaphysical 
thinking played a role in Thomas Aquinas, Heidegger wrote that 
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Aquinas’ theology had to be understood from the point of view of 
Kant’s notion of the transcendental ideal.  Even though this text is not 
too explicit, it does refer directly to the fact that Kant’s transcendental 
ideal is the key to understanding the relationship between Aquinas’ 
theology and an earlier theology, which presumably is Aristotle’s.38 
However, apart from the note from the summer semester 1928, 
there is no clear link established between this chapter of the Critique 
of Pure Reason and Aristotle’s problem of the qei=on.  In the winter 
semester 1927/28 lecture course entitled Einleitung in die 
Philosophie, which followed the one on Leibniz, Heidegger presented 
a long commentary on Kant’s transcendental ideal.  Yet, even though it 
was another testimony to this chapter’s importance, his commentary 
never went beyond paraphrase.  A short mention of our problem, 
nonetheless, emerges.  In this lecture course, Heidegger highlighted 
the fact that the problem of the transcendental ideal not only has to do 
with theology but that it is also of a highly philosophical nature:  
This reference [to Christian theology] doesn’t mean that . . . the 
problem falls in advance outside of the philosophical discussion.  
On the contrary, it indicates that in the discussion of this idea lies 
the fundamental possibility for a clarification of the fundamental 
problem of ancient philosophy and the way it had an impact on 
medieval Scholastic philosophy.39  
Kant’s text “Of the Transcendental Ideal [prototypon 
transcendentale]” consists of a very dense twelve page introduction to 
the questions concerning the possible proof of the existence of a 
supreme being, a section that concludes the “Transcendental Doctrine 
of Elements.”  After the exposition of his “System of Transcendental 
Ideas,” Kant continues with what he calls the ideal of pure reason.  An 
ideal, Kant writes, is a concept that serves as a standard [Richtmaß] in 
order to judge the integrality of the determination [Bestimmung] of a 
concrete thing.  The finite knowledge of a thing—that a finite being 
might have—is always considered finite, as opposed to a hypothetical 
complete and perfect knowledge of it.  According to Kant, this partial 
determination of a thing is the only determination of which human 
understanding is capable and is always carried out with respect to a 
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possible complete determination of the thing.  That is to say, human 
reason possesses a purely subjective idea of such a complete 
determination of a thing, from which it evaluates the determination it 
is capable of.  Thus, the simple fact that I am aware of the 
incompleteness of my determination of a thing is a testimony to my 
possessing such an idea of a theoretically possible complete 
determination.  The reason aims at complete and perfect 
determination, without being able empirically to reach it: “Hence 
reason thinks an object is to be thoroughly determinable . . . , although 
the conditions appropriate for this determination are lacking in 
experience and the concept itself is thus transcendent.”40 If a thing can 
always be determined more precisely, it is because we aim toward this 
ideal of a complete determination, even though it is only possible 
through an infinite understanding.   
To use an analogy, Kant writes that we judge the degree of an 
action’s virtue by comparing it to a moral ideal—which is, according 
to him, the wise man of the Stoics—an ideal that, although it exists 
only in one’s thought, is completely congruent with the idea of 
wisdom.41 Just as the wise man of the Stoics serves as a standard to 
judge, at a moral level, one’s virtue, pure reason also possesses, at a 
speculative level, a standard to which it can compare the degree of 
completeness of the determination or of the knowledge of a thing.  
“Just as the idea gives the rule,” Kant writes, “so the ideal serves in this 
case as the archetype [Urbild] for the thoroughgoing determination of 
the copy [Nachbild].”42  
When speculative reason claims to thoroughly determine a thing, 
it must compare its partial determination to a standard understood as 
the whole of possibility.  Every single thing is thus considered: 
in relation to the whole of possibility [auf die gesammte 
Möglichkeit], as the sum total [Inbegriff] of all predicates of things 
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in general . . . , as deriving its own possibility from the share it has 
in that whole of possibility.”43  
This “sum total of all predicates of things,” which Kant also calls the 
transcendental ideal is, in other words, the storehouse where all 
predicates that can be attributed to a thing are stocked, a 
“transcendental substratum . . . which contains, as it were, the entire 
storehouse of material from which all possible predicates of things are 
to be supplied.”44  Thus, a concrete thing is conceived as a limitation of 
this sum total of all predicates, in the same way as a geometrical figure 
represents a limitation of infinite geometrical space.45  The complete 
determination of a thing, if possible, is carried out as a limitation of all 
possible predicates to the sole predicates that properly constitute the 
thing itself.  However, this would mean, writes Kant, that “to attain a 
complete knowledge of a thing, one must possess a knowledge of 
everything that is possible,” something that of course never happens 
for a human subject.  This idea of a thoroughgoing determination is 
thus a concept that has no existence in concreto and resides only in 
reason.46  However, even though a thoroughgoing determination has no 
objective reality, Kant nonetheless considers this transcendental ideal 
as a necessary concept for the knowledge of a thing, thought of as a 
share of the whole of all predicates. 
So what is the ontological status that Kant reserves for this 
extraordinary concept called the transcendental ideal and that exists 
only in thought?  This “whole of all possibilities” or “of all possible 
predicates in general” is an ideal; that is, something that cannot be 
represented empirically but that does not, however, have the status of 
a chimera.  The ideal “forms the basis of the complete determination of 
everything that exists.”47 Kant writes: 
It is obvious that reason, in achieving its purpose, namely, of 
representing the necessary complete determination of things, does 
not presuppose the existence of a being that corresponds to this 
ideal, but only the idea of such a being. . . .  The ideal is, therefore, 
the archetype [prototypon] of all things, every one of which, as 
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imperfect copies [ectypa], derives from it the material of its 
possibility.48 
Kant gave this ideal different names.  These are all names that 
traditional theology gave to God, but Kant tried to sort out what 
belonged properly to the transcendental ideal.  He first called it the 
primordial being [ens originarium] insofar as all things—understood 
as incomplete copies—derive from it, as does the copy from an 
archetype.  The transcendental ideal is also the highest being [ens 
summum], insofar as anything that exists is below it.  Even though it 
might not be an effective being, as a possible being it is the highest of 
all.  It is finally the being of all beings [ens entium], insofar as 
everything is conditioned by it.  However, even though this 
transcendental ideal presents itself as a necessity for the speculative 
use of pure reason, we do not have the right, argued Kant, to deduce, 
speculatively, its objective existence. 
Despite having got this far, speculative reason must come to a halt 
in the determination of the transcendental ideal.  Every additional 
determination—let’s say “singular,” “simple,” “all-sufficient,” “eternal,” 
and so on—constitutes a hypostasis that leads speculative reason to 
define, illegitimately, the primordial being as a God. 49   The 
transcendental ideal is only the concept—not the cause—of all reality.  
For a thing to be determined integrally, the sole idea of the sum total 
of all predicates is sufficient.  Our world, understood as the 
effectuation of certain possibilities, constitutes a limitation of this 
primordial sum total, of the archetype called the transcendental ideal.  
Nonetheless, the relation between the world and this ideal should not 
be understood as a causal relation.  If this world is included in the 
transcendental ideal (as its limitation), it is not, as Heidegger puts it, in 
the sense of “an ontical dependency of the finite things as created 
toward an existing creator,”50 but as the restriction of an absolute 
totality of all possible things.  The transcendental ideal contains the 
sum total of all worldly possibilities without being the cause of the 
world, its ground or its fundament. 
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When reason infers the existence of a God from the 
transcendental ideal, it thus makes it a “pure fiction”;51 it takes this 
supreme reality as if it “would underlie the possibility of all things as a 
ground, and not as a sum total, as a whole.”52  What Kant writes here is 
fundamental for our purpose: it is an illegitimate use of speculative 
reason that leads us to interpret the whole of all possible reality, the 
transcendental ideal, as a basis, the ground for all things.  And, with 
this illegitimate inference, the transcendental ideal becomes “the 
object of a transcendental theology.”53  As Kant wrote, the three terms 
he used to refer to the ideal—ens originarium, ens summum, ens 
entium—do not “signify the objective relation of an actual object to 
other things, but only that of an idea to concepts; and, as to the 
existence of a being of such preeminent excellence, it leaves us in 
complete ignorance.”54  Speculative reason is in need of such a concept 
in order to produce finite determinations of things.  However, this 
need does not prove the existence of a supreme being in any way.   
So how can we explain this transformation of the transcendental 
ideal which, first understood as the sum of all reality, becomes the 
ground for all things? Kant writes, 
This ideal of the supremely real being . . . is first realized [realisirt], 
that is, made into an object; thereupon it is hypostatized; finally, by 
a natural advance of reason to the completion of unity, the ideal is 
even personified.55  
This by no means signifies that God’s existence is an illusion.  What 
Kant wants to propose here is reason’s incapacity, at a speculative 
level, to apprehend the existence of such a being.  As has been said, 
this illegitimate use of speculative reason led it to transform the whole 
[Inbegriff] into a ground [Grund]—or, according to Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Aristotle, to transform the qei=on into a qeo/j.   
The sections that Heidegger dedicated to this Kantian question in 
his winter 1928/29 lecture course do not mention Aristotle directly.  As 
we have seen, he only mentioned some “philosophical fundamental 
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problem,” which could, as I have argued, refer to the unity of 
metaphysical thought.  However, the parallel that can be drawn 
between the Heideggerian-Aristotelian theiological problem and the 
one presented in this chapter of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason leaves 
no doubt as to a possible connection.  According to this interpretation, 
we should conclude that the “worldly” concept of qei=on as found in 
Aristotle does not characterize so much a being that would be the 
cause of all beings, as a sum of all possibility from which a concrete 
being could be determined; what Heidegger refers to normally as 
beings as a whole, das Seiende im Ganzen.  The interpretation of this 
whole of all predicates as a ground was not so much the work of 
Aristotle as of the tradition that made, according to Kant’s idea, an 
illegitimate use of speculative reason.   
IV 
The interpretation given here of Heidegger’s reference to Kant’s 
Critique of Pure Reason in the context of an exegesis of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics could seem somewhat risky as it is not supported directly 
by any other Heideggerian text.  Nonetheless, the parallels drawn 
between both problems—that is, between Heidegger’s understanding 
of the erroneous traditional interpretation of Aristotle and, on the 
other hand, the Kantian idea of an illegitimate inference of the 
existence of a supreme being, based on the concept of “the sum of all 
possibilities”—seem clearly to point to the presence of a common 
problem in Kant and in Aristotle.  Aristotelianism, like the whole 
tradition, succumbed to the temptation of interpreting the 
transcendental ideal in theological terms.  While Kant provides the 
clues for us to understand the mechanisms of such an illegitimate 
interpretation and the key to avoiding it, the traditional interpretation 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as a direct ancestor of the proof of God’s 
existence gives us the perfect historic illustration of the problem.   
The demonstration Heidegger gives of this erroneous 
interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of qei=on cannot be carried out on 
the basis of a philological study of Aristotle’s work—that is precisely 
the critique he addressed to Natorp and Jaeger in 1928.  In fact, his 
interpretation takes as its basis a mechanism that belongs to human 
reason and that Kant highlighted in his first Critique.  What value can 
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we give to such a Kantian interpretation of Aristotle’s work? 
Philologically speaking, probably none.  However, embedded in an 
investigation specifically concerning the essence of metaphysics, this 
Heideggerian attempt to retrieve the Aristotelian problem with regard 
not to a better understanding of Aristotle’s work but to a better 
understanding of man’s attempts to answer metaphysical questions, is 
surely an important contribution.  These problems which Aristotle and 
Kant confronted find here a new shape.  They are transformed and 
revivified to such extent that they bring the metaphysical investigation 
to life once more. 
So how does this problem of a deviation of the question 
concerning beings as a whole to another one concerning the ground of 
all beings become an important question for today’s philosophy? Is this 
question of the pretheological status of Aristotle’s concept of the 
divine a mere historical issue, or could it also be a question for current 
metaphysics or, at least, for Heidegger’s metaphysics of Dasein? It 
seems, in fact, that this ontological or metaphysical enterprise that 
Heidegger carried out gives importance to something we might call a 
theiological—not theological—question, which could be seen as 
retrieving Aristotle’s problem of the qei=on.  This metaphysical project 
claims in fact to give an answer to a question concerning not only 
beings as beings, the ontological question, but also to a question 
concerning beings as a whole, a theiological question that calls upon 
Aristotle’s heritage. 
So we might consider Heidegger’s project of a metaphysics of 
Dasein as the retrieval of the two main problems of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics—that of the science of the o@n h[| o1n and that of the 
qeologikh\ e0pisth/mh—two questions that had been forgotten by 
tradition.  Sein und Zeit tried explicitly to retrieve the first of the two 
questions.  The second one—the question concerning the phenomenon 
of the world, beings as a whole—was also passed over by the 
ontological tradition, as Heidegger had already written in Sein und 
Zeit.56 From these two questions, Heidegger discovered a certain onto-
theiological structure in his own metaphysical thinking.  He explicitly 
drew parallels between his own attempt and Aristotle’s in the summer 
semester of 1928 and in the next one, during the winter semester of 
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1928/29.  In the latter, Heidegger affirmed that the problem of being is 
not the sole metaphysical problem and that both the problems of being 
and of the world “constitute the authentic concept of metaphysics.”57 
This idea had already emerged in the summer semester of 1928 when 
he brought up the idea of a “special problematic which has for its 
proper theme beings as a whole,” a “new investigation” that was the 
result of the overturning of ontology and to which Heidegger gave the 
name “metontology.”58 Heidegger here referred directly to the dual 
structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics:  
In their unity, fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the 
concept of metaphysics.  But herein is simply expressed the 
transformation of the one basic problem of philosophy itself, the 
one [of] the dual conception of philosophy as prw/th filosofi/a 
[first philosophy] and qeologi/a [theology].59 
During these years, Heidegger tried to find a way to deal with the 
problem of the world without taking it as the summation of all 
effective beings, as would the natural sciences.  In order to do so 
during the winter semester 1929/30 lecture course, Heidegger even 
retrieved his own idea of “formal indication” to differentiate his 
philosophical approach to the phenomenon of the world from the 
scientific concept of the world.  As we can see clearly in texts such as 
Vom Wesen des Grundes or in this 1929/30 metaphysical lecture 
course, Heidegger’s notion of the world does not concern only the 
effective beings, but also all possible beings.  Insofar as the world is 
characterized not so much by effective beings as by Dasein’s 
projection of his many relations with beings, Heidegger did not try to 
examine the cause of all effective beings but rather attempted to grasp 
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the world’s unity, its wholeness, or what he also called its “curvature” 
[Rundung].60 
Grasping Dasein as “being-in-the-world” or as a “world-forming 
being” opens new ways of posing this problem.  However, this 
nontraditional approach nonetheless has some precedents.  We have 
seen that this concept of beings as a whole could be found in Kant’s 
idea of a whole of all possibility, the transcendental ideal that lies at 
the bottom of all effective beings without acting as a cause.  We also 
found in Aristotle’s notion of the divine an antecedent of an attempt to 
approach the world with regard not to its cause but to its wholeness—
the divine [qei=on] understood as a whole [o3lon] and not as God [qeo/j].  
In this regard, Heidegger’s metaphysical enterprise succeeded in 
retrieving the question hidden behind the historical theologizing 
misinterpretations of Aristotle.61 
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